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Abstract
We discuss the question of how to operationally validate whether or not
a “hypercomputer” performs better than the known discrete computational
models.
1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged [1, 2] that every physical system corresponds to a com-
putational process, and that every computational process, if applicable, has to be
physically and operationally feasible in some concrete realization. In this sense,
the physical and computational capacities should match; because if one is lag-
ging behind the other, there is a lack in the formalism and its potential scientific
and ultimately technological applicability. Therefore, the exact correspondence
of the mathematical formalism on the one hand, and the particular physical sys-
tem which is represented by that formalism on the other hand, demands careful
attention.
If one insists on operationalizability [3], one needs not go very far in the his-
tory of mathematics to encounter suspicious mathematical objects. Surely enough,
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the number pi can be defined and effectively computed as the ratio of the circum-
ference to the diameter of a “perfect (platonic)” circle. Likewise, the numbers √2
and
√
3 can be interpreted as the ratio between the length of the diagonal to the
side length of any square and cube. But it is not totally unjustified to ask whether
or not these numbers have any operational meaning in a strict physical sense; i.e.,
whether such numbers could, at least in principle, be constructed and measured
with arbitrary or even with absolute precision.
At the heart of most of the problems seems to lie the ancient issue of the
“very large/small” or even potential infinite versus the actual infinite. Whereas
the mathematical formalism postulates the existence of actual infinite construc-
tions and methods, such as the summation of a (convergent) geometric series, or
diagonalization, the physical processes, methods and techniques are never infinite.
Suppose, as an example, one would attempt to operationalize pi. Any construc-
tion of a “real” circle and one of its diameters, and a subsequent measurement
thereof, would find its natural scale bound from below by the atomistic structure
of matter upon which any such circle is based. Long before those molecular or
atomic scales, the physical geometry might turn out to be not as straightforward
as it appears from larger scales; e.g., the object might turn out to be a fractal.
Chaitin’s Omega number [4] is interpretable as the halting probability of a uni-
versal computer. Omega is provably uncomputable; i.e., no computer, in any of
the (equivalent universal) forms conceptualized so far, “computes” Omega. Thus,
only hypercomputers might be capable to “compute” Omega. Yet, Omega can
be “computed in the limit” (without any computable radius of convergence) by a
finite-size program in infinite time and with infinite space. Just as for many tran-
scendential numbers — the difference being the absence of any computable radius
of convergence — the first digits of Omega are well known [5], yet Omega is prov-
able algorithmically incompressible and thus random. Nevertheless, presently, for
all practical purposes, the statement that “the 101010
10
th digit in a decimal expan-
sion of Euler’s number e is 5” is as unverifiable as a similar statement for Omega.
[Note, however, that for certain transcendental numbers such as Pi, the Bailey–
Borwein–Plouffe (BBP) formula [6, 7] can be used to efficiently calculate “large”
digits in various bases without knowing all of the previous digits.] Omega encodes
all decision problems which can be algorithmically interpreted. For instance, for
a particular universal computer, Goldbach’s conjecture and Riemann’s hypothesis
could be decided with programs of size 3484 and 7780 bits, respectively [8]. Yet,
Omega appears to have two features which are normally considered contradic-
tory: it is one of the most informative mathematical numbers imaginable. Yet at
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the same time this information is so compressed that it cannot be deciphered; thus
Omega appears to be totally structureless and random. In this sense, for Omega,
total information and total randomness seem to be “two sides of the same coin.”
On a more pragmatic level, it seems impossible here to differentiate between order
and chaos, between knowledge and chance. This gives a taste of what can be ex-
pected from any “hypercomputation” beyond universal computability as defined
by Turing.
It should always be kept in mind that all our sense perceptions are derived
from elementary discrete events, such as clicks in photon or particle detectors,
even if they appear to be analog: the apparently smooth behavior has a discrete
fine structure. Among other issues, such as finiteness of system resources, this
discreteness seems to prohibit the “physical realization” of any actual infinities.
What is the physical meaning of infinite concepts, such as space-time singular-
ities, point particles, or infinite precision? For instance, are infinity machines with
geometrically squeezed time cycles, such as the ones envisioned by Weyl [9] and
others [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20] physically feasible? Motivated
by recent proposals to utilize quantum computation for trespassing the Turing
barrier [21, 22, 23, 24], these accelerating Turing machines have been intensively
discussed [25] among other forms of hypercomputation [26, 27, 28].
Certainly, the almost ruthless and consequential application of seemingly mind-
boggling theories such as quantum mechanics, as far as finitistic methods are con-
cerned, has yielded one success after another. Nevertheless, the use of actual
transfinite concepts and methods remains highly conjectural.
A priori, while it may appear rash to exclude the transfinite in general, and
transfinite set theory in particular from physics proper, one should be aware of
its counterintuitive consequences, such as for instance the Banach-Tarski para-
dox, and be careful in claiming its physical applicability. Recall the old phrase
attributed to Einstein and Infeld (Ref. [29], p.31), “Physical concepts are free
creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely deter-
mined by the external world.”
To this point, we are not aware of any test, let alone any application, of the ac-
tual transfinite in Nature. While general contemplations about hypercomputations
and the applicability of transfinite concepts for physics may appear philosoph-
ically interesting, our main concern will be operational testability: if presented
with claims that hypercomputers exist, how could we possibly falsify, or even
verify and test such propositions [30]?
In what follows, hypercomputation will be conceptualized in terms of a black
box with its input/output behavior. Several tests and their rather limited scope
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will be evaluated. Already in 1958, Davis [31, p. 11] sets the stage of the follow-
ing discussion by pointing out “ . . . how can we ever exclude the possibility of our
being presented, some day (perhaps by some extraterrestrial visitors), with a (per-
haps extremely complex) device or “oracle” that “computes” a non-computable
function?” While this may have been a remote, amusing issue in the days writ-
ten, the advancement of physical theory in the past decades has made necessary a
careful evaluation of the possibilities and options for verification and falsification
of certain claims that a concrete physical system “computes” a non-computable
function.
2 On black boxes which are hypercomputers
Digital computers are “reliable” in the sense of “comprehensible, reproducible,
traceable, accountable,” just for the reason that the internal functioning of a digital
computer is known to anyone seeking such knowledge, and that the programs give
a logical specification of an algorithm. Because the code is known one can – at
least in principle – verify the behavior for all inputs mathematically.
One cannot expect that hypercomputers will be “reliable” in the aforemen-
tioned sense. The alleged “hypercomputer” may be presented as a device, an agent
or an oracle of unknown provenance, and in particular with no rational explana-
tion (in the traditional algorithmic sense) of its intrinsic working. (For the sake
of an example, consider Laplace being confronted with a modern digital clock.)
Therefore, we attempt to deal with hypercomputers purely phenomenologically;
i.e., by analyzing their input/output behavior. Thereby, the hypercomputer will be
treated as black box with input and output interfaces; see Fig. 1.
The following notation is introduced. Let B be a subset of X1× . . .×Xm. The
i-th projection of B (for i = 1, . . . ,m), written as Bi, is defined by:
Bi = {x | x ∈ Xi, (∃y ∈ X1× . . .×Xi−1)(∃z ∈ Xi+1×·· ·×Xm)
(y,x,z) ∈ B}.
For any x ∈ Nm we define
|x|= max{xi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}.
Then, a hypercomputer can be defined via its input/output behavior of black
boxes as follows.
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Figure 1: Hypercomputers of unknown origin may be studied phenomenologi-
cally; i.e., by considering them as a black box with input and output interfaces,
and by studying their input-output behavior.
Definition 1 (black box) Let X ,Y be sets and N be the set of natural numbers.
A subset B of X ×Y ×N is called a black box if B1 = X. X is called the input set
and Y the output set.
Note that the condition B1 = X models a computing device which is total, i.e.
there exists always an output.
Definition 2 Let B be a black box. We define
fB = {(x,y) | (∃z)(x,y,z) ∈ B},
tB = {(x,z) | (∃y)(x,y,z) ∈ B}.
fB is called the input-output relation of B and tB the computing time of B. If fB
and tB are functions then B is called deterministic.
Every halting deterministic Turing machine defines a black box. Indeed, let M
be a Turing machine (computing a total function), fM:X → Y be the function
computed by M and tM be the computing time of M. Then
{(x, fM(x), tM(x)) | x ∈ X}
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is a (deterministic) black box. Similarly all halting non-deterministic Turing ma-
chines define black boxes.
Definition 3 (hypercomputer) A strong hypercomputer is a black box B where
fB is not Turing-computable.
Definition 4 Let C be a class of computable monotone functions N→N contain-
ing the polynomials (over N with non-negative coefficients). Then C is called a
bound class.
Definition 5 A weak hypercomputer is a black box B with the following property:
There exists a bound class C such that
• tM(x)> g(|x|) almost everywhere for all g ∈ C and for all Turing machines
M with fM = fB.
• There exists an h ∈ C such that tB(x)≤ h(|x|) for all x ∈ B1.
A strong hypercomputer computes either a non-computable function or de-
cides an undecidable problem. A weak hypercomputation outperforms all Turing
machines. A possible scenario for a weak hypercomputer B is the following:
fB is an EXPTIME-complete problem, therefore there exists no polynomial p
and no Turing machine M computing fB with tM(x) ≤ p(|x|) for all x ∈ X , but
tB(x)≤ p(|x|) for all x ∈ X and for a polynomial p.
For non-deterministic hypercomputers we may distinguish between the fol-
lowing cases:
• fB is not a function,
• fB is a function, but tB is not.
For stochastic hypercomputers, either tB or both fB and tB are random vari-
ables, and the requirements on the computation have to be specified.
3 Tests
Having set the stage for a general investigation into hypercomputers which are
presented to us as black boxes, we shall consider a few cases and tests. These
test methods will be essentially heuristic and present no way of systematically
addressing the issue of falsifying or even verifying hypercomputation.
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One strategy for creating tests will be to consider problems which are asym-
metric with respect to their creation and verification — which should be “easy”
— on the one hand, and their solution — which should be “hard” — on the other
hand.
3.1 NP-complete cases
It may be conjectured that, by operational means, it is not possible to go beyond
tests of hyper-NP-completeness. Even for an NP-complete problem as for in-
stance the satisfiability problem of propositional logic (SAT), it is not trivial to
verify that a hypercomputer solves the problem in polynomial time. Without in-
sight into the internal structure of the hypercomputer we cannot obtain a proof of
polynomial time computation, which is an asymptotic result. Even here we rely
on experiments to test a “large” number of problems. A central problem consists
in the right selection of problem sequences. If the selection is based on random
generators we merely obtain results on average complexity, which would not be
significant.
Furthermore, we need at least some information about the polynomial in ques-
tion (e.g., its maximum degree). Otherwise it remains impossible to decide by
finite means whether some behavior is polynomial or not.
3.2 Harder cases with tractable verification
Do there exist (decision) problems which are harder than the known NP-complete
cases, possibly having no recursively enumerable solution and proof methods,
whose results nevertheless are tractable verifiable? For example, the problem of
graph non-isomorphism (GNI) is one that is not known to be in NP, not even in
NP ∪ BPP. Nevertheless, it is possible to “efficiently verify” whether a “prover”
solves this problem correctly.
If the prover claims that two graphs G1 and G2 are isomorphic, he can convince
us by providing a graph isomorphism. That can be checked in polynomial time,
which also means that GNI ∈ coNP. If, on the other hand, the prover claims that
G1 and G2 are non-isomorphic, we can verify this by the following interactive
proof :
1. Choose one of the graphs G1 and G2 with equal probability.
2. Apply an arbitrary permutation to its vertices; this yields graph H.
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3. The prover must decide whether H is equivalent to G1 or G2.
4. Repeat for N rounds.
If the initial answer was wrong and the graphs G1 and G2 are actually isomor-
phic, the prover can in step 3 only guess which graph was chosen in step 1 (since
now H could have been derived from either). Hence, after N rounds we can be
sure with probability 1−2−N that the graphs G1 and G2 are non-isomorphic.
By denoting the class of interactive proofs by IP, we have shown that GNI∈ IP.
Interactive proofs further exist for every language in PSPACE (which is assumed
to be much larger than NP). In fact, it can be shown [32] that IP equals PSPACE.
This means, in particular, that IP is closed under complement.
The protocol in the example above has the property that in each round a
constant number of messages is sent. In a generic interactive proof system for
PSPACE this is not necessarily true; but at any instance the number of messages
depends polynomially on the input length.
In the literature, specific classes of interactive proof systems are investigated as
well, e.g. the Arthur-Merlin class [33] and the Goldwasser-Micali-Rackoff (GMR)
class [34]. The former uses public coin tosses, with the intention to accommodate
certain languages in as low complexity classes as possible. The latter uses private
coin tosses, with the intention to cover the widest possible class of efficiently
verifiable languages; additionally, it has the feature of providing zero-knowledge
proofs, which is of great significance in cryptography. (The protocol presented
above does not have the zero-knowledge property – unless GNI ∈ BPP –, but can
be modified to have.) For further information on interactive proof systems see
[35, 36].
3.3 Interference of problems
One may confront the hypercomputer with the problem of comparing the solutions
of multiple tasks. Such a comparison needs not necessarily involve the separate
computation of the solutions of these multiple tasks.
As an analogy, consider Deutsch’s problem as one of the first problems which
quantum computers could solve effectively. Consider a function that takes a single
(classical) bit into a single (classical) bit. There are four such functions f1, . . . , f4,
corresponding to all variations. One can specify or “prepare” a function bitwise,
or alternatively, one may specify it by requiring that, for instance, such a function
acquires different values on different inputs, such as f (0) 6= f (1). Thereby, we
may, even in principle, learn nothing about the individual functional values alone.
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A related issue is the question of whether or not one hypercomputer should
be allowed to verify another hypercomputation. This would be similar to using
one algorithm to prove the four color theorem, and, since it is unfeasible for a
human to verify by hand, another algorithm to check the validity of the former
computer-assisted proof.
3.4 Generation of random sequences
By implementation of Chaitin’s “algorithm” to compute Chaitin’s Ω [37] or vari-
ants thereof [38], it would in principle be possible to “compute” the first bits of
random sequences. Such random sequences could in principle be subject to the
usual tests of stochasticity [39, 40].
Note that in quantum mechanics, the randomness of certain microphysical
events, such as the spontaneous decay of excited quantum states [41, 42], or the
quantum coin toss experiments in complete context mismatches [39] is postulated
as an axiom. This postulate is then used as the basis for the production of quantum
randomness oracles such as the commercially available QuantisTM interface [43].
4 Impossibility of unsolvable problems whose “so-
lution” is polynomially verifiable
Let Σ0 be a finite (non-empty) alphabet and X ⊂ Σ∗0 be a semi-decidable, but
not decidable set. That means there exists a Turing machine which accepts the
language X , but does not terminate on all x ∈ Σ∗0. The concept of acceptable by
Turing machines is equivalent to derivable by inference systems or producible by
grammars. We choose the approach of a universal proof system, i.e. of a system
which simulates every Turing machine.
Let P be such a proof system. Let V be an infinite set of variables (over strings
in Σ∗). A meta-string is an object x1 . . .xn where xi ∈ Σ or xi ∈V . If X is a meta-
string and θ is a substitution (i.e. a mapping V → (V ∪Σ)∗) then Xθ is called an
instance of X . If Xθ ∈ Σ∗ we call Xθ a ground instance of X .
We may define P = (Y ,X ,Σ,Σ0) where Y is a finite sets of meta-strings (the
axioms) and X is a finite set of rules, i.e. expressions of the form:
X1 . . .Xn
X
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where X1, . . . ,Xn,X are meta-strings such that the set of variables in X is contained
in the set of variables in X1, . . . ,Xn.
Σ0 is a (non-empty) subset of Σ (defining the strings of the theory to be gener-
ated).
A derivation ϕ in P is a tree such that all nodes are labelled by strings in Σ∗. In
particular:
• the leaves of ϕ are labelled by ground instances of axioms.
• Let N be a node in ϕ which is not a leaf and (N,N1), . . . ,(N,Nk) be the
nodes from N then
N1 . . .Nk
N
is a ground instance of a rule in X .
A proof of an x in Σ∗0 in P is a derivation in P with the root node labeled by x.
x is called provable in P if there exists a proof of x in P.
fact: as Σ is finite there are only finitely many derivations of length ≤ k for any
natural number k, where length is the number of symbol occurrences. Let P[k] be
the set of all derivations of length ≤ k.
We prove now:
There is no recursive function g such that for all x ∈ X :
(∗) x is provable in P iff there exists a proof ϕ of x with |ϕ| ≤ g(|x|).
Proof:
Assume that there exists a recursive g such that (∗) holds. We construct a decision
procedure of X :
input: x ∈ X .
• compute g(|x|).
• construct P[g(|x|)].
• if P[g(|x|)] contains a proof of x then x ∈ X
else x 6∈ X .
But we assumed X to be undecidable, thus we arrive at a complete contradiction.
Q.E.D.
It follows as a corollary that there exists no proof system which generates an
undecidable problem X and X is polynomially verifiable.
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The result above illustrates one of the problems in acknowledging hypercom-
putation. Even if we have a strong hypercomputer solving, let us say, the halting
problem, the verification of its correctness is ultimately unfeasible. Due to the
absence of recursive bounds we cannot expect to obtain a full proof of the corre-
sponding property (halting or non-halting) from the hypercomputer itself.
When we consider the halting problem and the property of non-halting, this
can only be verified by a proof (and not by simulating a Turing machine). By the
undecidability of the problem there is no complete (recursive) proof system doing
the job. So when we obtain a verification from the hypercomputer concerning
non-halting, the form of this verification lies outside computational proof systems.
However we might think about the following test procedure for hypercomput-
ers: humans create a test set of problems for an undecidable problem X , i.e. a finite
set Y with Y ∩X 6= /0 and Y ∩X c 6= /0. The humans are in possession of the solu-
tions, preferably of proofs ϕy of y∈X or of y 6∈X for any y∈Y . This finite set may
at least serve the purpose of falsifying hypercomputation (provided the hypercom-
puter is not stochastic and wrong answers are admitted). Beyond the possibility
of falsification we might consider the following scenario: the hypercomputer an-
swers all questions concerning the test set Y correctly, and its computing time is
independent of the complexity of the proofs ϕy. Such a phenomenon would, of
course, not yield a verification of the hypercomputer but at least indicate a behav-
ior structurally differing from computable proof systems.
But the ultimate barrier of verifying a hypercomputer is that of verifying a
black box, characterized by the attempt to induce a property of infinitely many
input-output pairs by a finite test set.
5 Discussion and summary
The considerations presented here may be viewed as special cases of a very gen-
eral black box identification problem: is it possible to deduce certain features of
a black box, without screwing the box open and without knowing the intrinsic
working of the black box, from its input/output behavior alone? Several issues of
this general problem have already been discussed. For instance, in an effort to for-
malize the uncertainty principle, Moore [44] considered initial state identification
problems of (given) deterministic finite automata. Gold [45, 46, 47, 48, 49] con-
sidered a question related to induction: if one restricts black boxes to computable
functions, then the rule inference problem, i.e., the problem to find out which
function is implemented by the black box, is in general unsolvable. The halting
11
problem [50, 51, 52] can be translated into a black box problem: given a black
box with known partial recursive function, then its future behavior is generally
unpredictable. Even the problem to determine whether or not a black box system
is polynomial in computation space and time appears to be far from being trivial.
In general, finding a way to falsify hypercomputation by a single counterexample
may turn out to be easier than proving hypercomputation in full generality.
So, if presented with a hypercomputer or oracle, we could only assert heuris-
tic information, nothing more. We have to accept the fact that more general as-
sertions, or even proofs for computational capacities beyond very limited finite
computational capacities remain impossible, and will possibly remain so forever.
The situation is not dissimilar from claims of absolute indeterminism and ran-
domness on a microphysical scale [39], where a few, albeit subtle tests of time
series [40] generated by quantum randomness oracles such as QuantisTM [43] can
be compared against advanced algorithmic random number generators such as the
Rule30CA Wolfram rule 30 generator implemented by Mathematica R©. Beyond
heuristic testing, any general statement about quantum randomness remains con-
jectural.
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